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Abstract. This paper explores the Coevolutionary Optional Prisoner’s
Dilemma (COPD) game, which is a simple model to coevolve game strat-
egy and link weights of agents playing the Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma
game. We consider a population of agents placed in a lattice grid with
boundary conditions. A number of Monte Carlo simulations are per-
formed to investigate the impacts of the COPD game on the emergence
of cooperation. Results show that the coevolutionary rules enable coop-
erators to survive and even dominate, with the presence of abstainers in
the population playing a key role in the protection of cooperators against
exploitation from defectors. We observe that in adverse conditions such
as when the initial population of abstainers is too scarce/abundant, or
when the temptation to defect is very high, cooperation has no chance
of emerging. However, when the simple coevolutionary rules are applied,
cooperators flourish.
Keywords: Coevolution; Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma Game; Evolu-
tionary Game Theory; Cooperation.
1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory in spatial environments has attracted much interest
from researchers who seek to understand cooperative behaviour among rational
individuals in complex environments. Many models have considered the scenarios
where participant’s interactions are constrained by particular graph topologies,
such as lattices [16,13], small-world graphs [5,7], scale-free graphs [18,20] and,
bipartite graphs [9]. It has been shown that the spatial organisation of strategies
on these topologies affects the evolution of cooperation [3].
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game remains one of the most studied games
in evolutionary game theory as it provides a simple and powerful framework to
illustrate the conflicts inherent in the formation of cooperation. In addition, some
extensions of the PD game, such as the Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma (OPD)
game, have been studied in an effort to investigate how levels of cooperation
can be increased. In the OPD game, participants are afforded a third option —
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that of abstaining and not playing and thus obtaining the loner’s payoff (L).
Incorporating this concept of abstention leads to a three-strategy game where
participants can choose to cooperate, defect or abstain from a game interaction.
The vast majority of the spatial models in previous work have used static and
unweighted networks. However, in many social scenarios that we wish to model,
such as social networks and real biological networks, the number of individu-
als, their connections and environment are often dynamic. Thus, recent studies
have also investigated the effects of evolutionary games played on dynamically
weighted networks [11,19,2,17,22] where it has been shown that the coevolution
of both networks and game strategies can play a key role in resolving social
dilemmas in a more realistic scenario.
In this paper we define and explore the Coevolutionary Optional Prisoner’s
Dilemma (COPD) game, which is a simple coevolutionary spatial model where
both the game strategies and the link weights between agents evolve over time.
In this model, the interaction between agents is described by an OPD game.
Previous research on spatial games has shown that when the temptation to
defect is high, defection is the dominant strategy in most cases. We believe that
the combination of both optional games and coevolutionary rules can help in the
emergence of cooperation in a wider range of scenarios.
Thus, given the Coevolutionary Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma game (i.e., an
OPD game in a spatial environment, where links between agents can be evolved),
the aims of the work are to understand the effect of varying the parameters T
(temptation to defect), L (loner’s payoff), ∆ and δ for both unbiased and biased
environments.
By investigating the effect of these parameters, we aim to:
– Compare the outcomes of the COPD game with other games.
– Explore the impact of the link update rules and its properties.
– Investigate the evolution of cooperation when abstainers are present in the
population.
– Investigate how many abstainers would be necessary to guarantee robust
cooperation.
The results show that cooperation emerges even in extremely adverse scenar-
ios where the temptation to defect is almost at its maximum. It can be observed
that the presence of the abstainers are fundamental in protecting cooperators
from invasion. In general, it is shown that, when the coevolutionary rules are
used, cooperators do much better, being also able to dominate the whole popula-
tion in many cases. Moreover, for some settings, we also observe interesting phe-
nomena of cyclic competition between the three strategies, in which abstainers
invade defectors, defectors invade cooperators and cooperators invade abstainers.
The paper outline is as follows: Section 2 presents a brief overview of the
previous work in both spatial evolutionary game theory with dynamic networks
and in the Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Section 3 gives an overview of
the methodology employed, outlining the Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff
matrix, the coevolutionary model used (Monte Carlo simulation), the strategy
and link weight update rules, and the parameter values that are varied in order
to explore the effect of coevolving both strategies and link weights. Section 4
discusses the benefits of combining the concept of abstention and coevolution.
Section 5 further explore the effect of using the COPD game in an unbiased
environment. Section 6 investigates the robustness of cooperative behaviour in
a biased environment. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the main conclusions and
outlines future work.
2 Related Work
The use of coevolutionary rules constitute a new trend in evolutionary game the-
ory. These rules were first introduced by Zimmermann et al. [21], who proposed
a model in which agents can adapt their neighbourhood during a dynamical
evolution of game strategy and graph topology. Their model uses computer sim-
ulations to implement two rules: firstly, agents playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game update their strategy (cooperate or defect) by imitating the strategy of an
agent in their neighbourhood with a higher payoff; and secondly, the network is
updated by allowing defectors to break their connection with other defectors and
replace the connection with a connection to a new neighbour selected randomly
from the whole network. Results show that such an adaptation of the network
is responsible for an increase in cooperation.
In fact, as stated by Perc and Szolnoki [15], the spatial coevolutionary game is
a natural upgrade of the traditional spatial evolutionary game initially proposed
by Nowak and May [13], who considered static and unweighted networks in which
each individual can interact only with its immediate neighbours. In general, it
has been shown that coevolving the spatial structure can promote the emergence
of cooperation in many scenarios [19,2], but the understanding of cooperative
behaviour is still one of the central issues in evolutionary game theory.
Szolnoki and Perc [17] proposed a study of the impact of coevolutionary rules
on the spatial version of three different games, i.e., the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the
Snow Drift and the Stag Hunt game. They introduce the concept of a teaching
activity, which quantifies the ability of each agent to enforce its strategy on the
opponent. It means that agents with higher teaching activity are more likely
to reproduce than those with a low teaching activity. Differing from previous
research [22,21], they also consider coevolution affecting either only the defectors
or only the cooperators. They discuss that, in both cases and irrespective of
the applied game, their coevolutionary model is much more beneficial to the
cooperators than that of the traditional model.
Huang et al. [11] present a new model for the coevolution of game strategy
and link weight. They consider a population of 100 × 100 agents arranged on
a regular lattice network which is evolved through a Monte Carlo simulation.
An agent’s interaction is described by the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma with a
normalized payoff matrix. A new parameter, ∆/δ, is defined as the link weight
amplitude and is calculated as the ratio of ∆/δ. They found that some values
of ∆/δ can provide the best environment for the evolution of cooperation. They
also found that their coevolutionary model can promote cooperation efficiently
even when the temptation of defection is high.
In addition to investigations of the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma on spatial
environments, some extensions of this game have also been explored as a means
to favour the emergence of cooperative behaviour. For instance, the Optional
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, which introduces the concept of abstention, has been
studied since Batali and Kitcher [1]. In their work, they proposed the opt-out or
“loner’s” strategy in which agents could choose to abstain from playing the game,
as a third option, in order to avoid cooperating with known defectors. There
have been a number of recent studies exploring this type of game [20,8,14,12,10].
Cardinot et al. [3] discuss that, with the introduction of abstainers, it is possible
to observe new phenomena and, in a larger range of scenarios, cooperators can
be robust to invasion by defectors and can dominate.
Although recent work has discussed the inclusion of optional games with
coevolutionary rules [4], this still needs to be investigated in a wider range of
scenarios. Therefore, our work aims to combine both of these trends in evolution-
ary game theory in order to identify favourable configurations for the emergence
of cooperation in adverse scenarios, where, for example, the temptation to defect
is very high or when the initial population of abstainers is either very scarce or
very abundant.
3 Methodology
The goal of the experiments outlined in this section is to investigate the envi-
ronmental settings when coevolution of both strategy and link weights of the
Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma on a weighted network takes place.
This section includes a complete description of the Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) game, the spatial environment and the coevolutionary rules for both the
strategy and link weights. Finally, we also outline the experimental set-up.
In the classical version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, two agents can choose
either cooperation or defection. Hence, there are four payoffs associated with
each pairwise interaction between the two agents. In consonance with common
practice [11,13], payoffs are characterized by the reward for mutual cooperation
(R = 1), punishment for mutual defection (P = 0), sucker’s payoff (S = 0) and
temptation to defect (T = b, where 1 < b < 2). Note that this parametrization
refers to the weak version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where P can be equal
to S without destroying the nature of the dilemma. In this way, the constraints
T > R > P ≥ S maintain the dilemma.
The extended version of the PD game presented in this paper includes the
concept of abstention, in which agents can not only cooperate (C) or defect
(D) but can also choose to abstain (A) from a game interaction, obtaining the
loner’s payoff (L = l) which is awarded to both players if one or both abstain.
As defined in other studies [3,16], abstainers receive a payoff greater than P and
less than R (i.e., P < L < R). Thus, considering the normalized payoff matrix
adopted, 0 < l < 1. The payoff matrix and the associated values are illustrated
in Table 1.
Table 1: The Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma game matrix.
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(a) Extended game matrix.
Payoff Value
Temptation to defect (T) ]1, 2[
Reward for mutual cooperation (R) 1
Punishment for mutual defection (P) 0
Sucker’s payoff (S) 0
Loner’s payoff (L) ]0, 1[
(b) Payoff values.
In these experiments, the following parameters are used: a 102× 102 (N =
1022) regular lattice grid with periodic boundary conditions is created and fully
populated with agents, which can play with their eight immediate neighbours
(Moore neighbourhood). We adopt an unbiased environment (in which initially
each agent is designated as a cooperator (C), defector (D) or abstainer (A) with
equal probability) as well as investigating a biased environment (in which the
percentage of abstainers present in the environment is varied). Also, each edge
linking agents has the same initial weight w = 1, which will adaptively change
in accordance with the interaction.
Monte Carlo methods are used to perform the Coevolutionary Optional Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game. In one Monte Carlo (MC) step, each player is selected
once on average. This means that one MC step comprises N inner steps where
the following calculations and updates occur:
– Select an agent (x) at random from the population.
– Calculate the utility uxy of each interaction of x with its eight neighbours
(each neighbour represented as agent y) as follows:
uxy = wxyPxy, (1)
where wxy is the edge weight between agents x and y, and Pxy corresponds
to the payoff obtained by agent x on playing the game with agent y.
– Calculate Ux the accumulated utility of x, that is:
Ux =
∑
y∈Ωx
uxy, (2)
where Ωx denotes the set of neighbours of the agent x.
– In order to update the link weights, wxy, between agents, compare the values
of uxy and the average accumulated utility (i.e., U¯x = Ux/8) as follows:
wxy =

wxy +∆ if uxy > U¯x
wxy −∆ if uxy < U¯x
wxy otherwise
, (3)
where ∆ is a constant such that 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ δ.
– In line with previous research [11,19], wxy is adjusted to be within the range
1− δ ≤ wxy ≤ 1 + δ, (4)
where δ (0 < δ ≤ 1) defines the weight heterogeneity. Note that when ∆ or
δ are equal to 0, the link weight keeps constant (w = 1), which results in the
traditional scenario where only the strategies evolve.
– In order to update the strategy of x, the accumulated utility Ux is recalcu-
lated (based on the new link weights) and compared with the accumulated
utility of one randomly selected neighbour (Uy). If Uy > Ux, agent x will
copy the strategy of agent y with a probability proportional to the utility
difference (Equation 5), otherwise, agent x will keep its strategy for the next
step.
p(sx = sy) =
Uy − Ux
8(T − P ) , (5)
where T is the temptation to defect and P is the punishment for mutual
defection. This equation has been considered previously by Huang et al.
[11].
Simulations are run for 105 MC steps and the fraction of cooperation is
determined by calculating the average of the final 103 MC steps. To alleviate the
effect of randomness in the approach, the final results are obtained by averaging
10 independent runs. The following scenarios are investigated:
– The benefits of coevolution and abstention.
– Presence of abstainers in the coevolutionary model.
– Inspecting the coevolutionary environment.
– Investigating the properties of the parameters ∆ and δ.
– Varying the number of states.
– Investigating the relationship between ∆/δ, b and l.
– Investigating the robustness of cooperation in a biased environment.
4 The Benefits of Coevolution and Abstention
This section presents some of the main differences between the outcomes ob-
tained by the proposed Coevolutionary Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma (COPD)
game and other models which do not adopt the concept of coevolution and/or
abstention. In the COPD game, we also investigate how a population in an
unbiased environment evolves over time.
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Fig. 1: Comparison of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), the Coevolutionary Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (CPD) and the Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma (OPD) games. All
with the same temptation to defect, b = 1.9.
4.1 Presence of Abstainers in the Coevolutionary Model
In order to provide a means to effectively explore the impact of our coevolu-
tionary model, i.e., the Coevolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma (COPD) game, in
the emergence of cooperation, we start by investigating the performance of some
of the existing models. Namely, the Coevolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma (CPD)
game (i.e., same coevolutionary model as the COPD but without the concept of
abstention), the traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, and the Optional
Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
As shown in Figure 1, it can be observed that for both PD and CPD games,
when the defector’s payoff is very high (i.e., b > 1.7) defectors spread quickly
and dominate the environment. On the other hand, when abstainers are present
in a static and unweighted network, i.e., playing the OPD game, we end up with
abstainers dominating the environment. Undoubtedly, in many scenarios, having
a population of abstainers is better than a population of defectors. However, it
provides clear evidence that all these three models fail to sustain cooperation.
In fact, results show that in this type of adverse environment (i.e., with a high
temptation to defect), cooperation has no chance of emerging.
Surprisingly, as shown in Figure 2, when considering the Coevolutionary
Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma (COPD) game for the same environmental settings
of Figure 1 (i.e., l = 0.6, ∆ = 0.72 and ∆ = 0.72), with the temptation of
defection almost at its peak (i.e., b = 1.9), it is possible to reach high levels of
cooperation.
Figure 2 shows a typical phase diagram for both CPD and COPD games for a
fixed value of δ = 0.8 and l = 0.6 (on the COPD game). It can be observed that
if a given environmental setting (i.e, b, ∆ and δ) produces a stable population of
cooperators in the CPD game, then the presence of abstainers will not change
it. In other words, the COPD game does not affect the outcome of scenarios in
which cooperation is stable in the absence of abstainers. Thus, the main changes
occur in scenarios in which defection dominates or survives (b > 1.5).
To summarize, despite the fact that the Coevolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma
(CPD) game succeeds in the promotion of cooperation in a wide range of scenar-
Fig. 2: Typical phase diagram for an initial balanced population playing the
Coevolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma game (left) and the Coevolutionary Optional
Prisoner’s Dilemma game with l = 0.6 (right), both with δ = 0.8.
ios, it is still not able to avoid the invasion by defectors in cases where b > 1.5,
which does not happen when the abstainers are present (i.e., COPD game).
4.2 Inspecting the Coevolutionary Environment
In order to further explain the results witnessed in the previous experiments, we
investigate how the population evolves over time for the Coevolutionary Optional
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Figure 3 features the time course of cooperation for
three different values of ∆/δ = {0.0, 0.2, 1.0}, which are some of the critical
points when b = 1.9, l = 0.6 and δ = 0.8. Based on these results, in Figure 4
we show snapshots for the Monte Carlo steps 0, 45, 1113 and 105 for the three
scenarios shown in Figure 3.
We see from Figure 4 that for the traditional case (i.e., ∆/δ = 0.0), abstainers
spread quickly and reach a stable state in which single defectors are completely
isolated by abstainers. In this way, as the payoffs obtained by a defector and an
abstainer are the same, neither will ever change their strategy. In fact, even if a
single cooperator survives up to this stage, for the same aforementioned reason,
its strategy will not change either. In fact, the same behaviour is noticed for any
value of b > 1.2 and ∆/δ = 0 (COPD in Figure 2).
When ∆/δ = 0.2, it is possible to observe some sort of equilibrium between
the three strategies. They reach a state of cyclic competition in which abstainers
invade defectors, defectors invade cooperators and cooperators invade abstainers.
This behaviour, of balancing the three possible outcomes, is very common
in nature where species with different reproductive strategies remain in equilib-
rium in the environment. For instance, the same scenario was observed as being
responsible for preserving biodiversity in the neighbourhoods of the Escherichia
coli, which is a bacteria commonly found in the lower intestine of warm-blooded
organisms. According to Fisher [6], studies were performed with three natural
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Fig. 3: Progress of the fraction of cooperation ρc during a Monte Carlo simulation
for b = 1.9, l = 0.6 and δ = 0.8.
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Fig. 4: Snapshots of the distribution of the strategy in the Monte Carlo steps 0,
45, 1113 and 105 (from left to right) for ∆/δ equal to 0.0, 0.2 and 1.0 (from top to
bottom). In this Figure, cooperators, defectors and abstainers are represented by
the colours blue, red and green respectively. All results are obtained for b = 1.9,
l = 0.6 and δ = 0.8.
populations mixed together, in which one population produces a natural antibi-
otic but is immune to its effects; a second population is sensitive to the antibiotic
but can grow faster than the third population; and the third population is re-
sistant to the antibiotic.
Because of this balance, they observed that each population ends up estab-
lishing its own territory in the environment, as the first population could kill
off any other bacteria sensitive to the antibiotic, the second population could
use their faster growth rate to displace the bacteria which are resistant to the
antibiotic, and the third population could use their immunity to displace the
first population.
Another interesting behaviour is noticed for ∆/δ = 1.0. In this scenario,
defectors are dominated by abstainers, allowing a few clusters of cooperators to
survive. As a result of the absence of defectors, cooperators invade abstainers
and dominate the environment.
5 Exploring the Coevolutionary Optional Prisoner’s
Dilemma game
In this section, we present some of the relevant experimental results of the Monte
Carlo simulations of the Coevolutionary Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma game in an
unbiased environment. That is, a well-mixed initial population with a balanced
amount of cooperators, defectors and abstainers.
5.1 Investigating the properties of ∆ and δ
This section aims to investigate the properties of the presented model (Sect. 3)
in regard to the parameters ∆ and δ. These parameters play a key role in the
evolutionary dynamics of this model because they define the number of possible
link weights that an agent is allowed to have (i.e., they define the number of
states).
Despite the fact that the number of states is discrete, the act of counting
them is not straightforward. For instance, when counting the number of states
between 1 − δ and 1 + δ for ∆ = 0.2 and δ = 0.3, we could incorrectly state
that there are four possible states for this scenario (i.e., {0.7, 0.9, 1.1, 1.3}).
However, considering that the link weights of all edges are initially set to w = 1,
and due to the other constraints (Equations 3 and 4), the number of states is
actually seven (i.e., {0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3}).
In order to better understand the relationship between ∆ and δ, we plot
∆, δ and ∆/δ as a function of the number of states (numerically counted) for
a number of different values of both parameters (Figure 5). It was observed
that given the pairs (∆1, δ1) and (∆2/δ2), if ∆1/δ1 is equal to ∆2/δ2, then the
number of states of both settings is the same.
Figure 5 shows the ratio ∆/δ as a function of the number of states. As we can
see, although the function is non-linear and non-monotonic, in general, higher
values of ∆/δ have less states.
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Fig. 5: The ratio ∆/δ as a function of the number of states. For any combination
of ∆ and δ, the ration ∆/δ will always have the same number of states.
5.2 Varying the Number of States
Figure 6 shows the impact of the coevolutionary model on the emergence of
cooperation when the ratio ∆/δ varies for a range of fixed values of the loner’s
payoff (l), temptation to defect (b) and δ. In this experiment, we observe that
when l = 0.0, the outcomes of the Coevolutionary Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma
(COPD) game are very similar to those observed by Huang et al. [11] for the
Coevolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma (CPD) game. This result can be explained
by the normalized payoff matrix adopted in this work (Table 1). Clearly, when
l = 0.0, there is no advantage in abstaining from playing the game, thus agents
choose the option to cooperate or defect.
Results indicate that, in cases where the temptation to defect is very low (e.g,
b ≤ 1.34), the level of cooperation does not seem to be affected by the increment
of the loner’s payoff, except when the advantage of abstaining is very high (e.g,
l > 0.8). However, these results highlight that the presence of the abstainers
may protect cooperators from invasion. Moreover, the difference between the
traditional Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma (i.e., ∆/δ = 0.0) for l = {0.0, 0.6} and
all other values of ∆/δ is strong evidence that our coevolutionary model is very
advantageous to the promotion of cooperative behaviour.
Namely, when l = 0.6, in the traditional case with a static and unweighted
network (∆/δ = 0.0), the cooperators have no chance of surviving; except, of
course, when b is very close to the reward for mutual cooperation R, where it
is possible to observe scenarios of quasi-stable states of the three strategies or
between cooperators and defectors. In fact, in the traditional OPD (∆/δ = 0.0),
when l > 0.0 and b > 1.2, abstainers are always the dominant strategy. However,
when the coevolutionary rules are used, cooperators do much better, being also
able to dominate the whole population in many cases.
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Fig. 6: Relationship between cooperation and the ratio ∆/δ when the loner’s
payoff (l) is equal to 0.0 (left) and 0.6 (right).
It is noteworthy that the curves in Figure 6 are usually non-linear and/or
non-monotonic because of the properties of the ratio∆/δ in regard to the number
of states of each combination of ∆ and δ (Sect. 5.1).
5.3 Investigating the Relationship between ∆/δ, b and l
To investigate the outcomes in other scenarios, we explore a wider range of
settings by varying the values of the temptation to defect (b), the loner’s payoff
(l) and the ratio ∆/δ for a fixed value of δ = 0.8.
As shown in Figure 7, cooperation is the dominant strategy in the majority of
cases. Note that in the traditional case, with an unweighted and static network,
i.e., ∆/δ = 0.0, abstainers dominate in all scenarios illustrated in this ternary
diagram. In addition, it is also possible to observe that certain combinations of l,
b and ∆/δ guarantee higher levels of cooperation. In these scenarios, cooperators
are protected by abstainers against exploitation from defectors.
Another observation is that defectors are attacked more efficiently by ab-
stainers as we increase the loner’s payoff (l). Simulations reveal that, for any
scenario, if the loner’s payoff is greater than 0.7 (l > 0.7), defectors have no
chance of surviving.
However, the drawback of increasing the value of l is that it makes it diffi-
cult for cooperators to dominate abstainers, which might produce a quasi-stable
population of cooperators and abstainers. It is noteworthy that it is a counter-
intuitive result from the COPD game, since the loner’s payoff is always less than
the reward for mutual cooperation (i.e., L < R), even for extremely high values
of L. This scenario (population of cooperators and abstainers) should always
lead cooperators to quickly dominate the environment.
In fact, it is still expected that, in the COPD game, cooperators dominate
abstainers, but depending on the value of the loner’s payoff, or the amount of
abstainers in the population at this stage, it might take several Monte Carlo steps
to reach a stable state, which is usually a state of cooperation fully dominating
the population.
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Fig. 7: Ternary diagrams of different values of b, l and ∆/δ for δ = 0.8.
An interesting behaviour is noticed when l = [0.45, 0.55] and b > 1.8. In this
scenario, abstainers quickly dominate the population, making a clear division
between two states: before this range (defectors hardly die off) and after this
range (defectors hardly survive). In this way, a loner’s payoff value greater than
0.55 (l > 0.55) is usually the best choice to promote cooperation. This result is
probably related to the difference between the possible utilities for each type of
interaction, which still needs further investigation in future.
Although the combinations shown in Figure 7 for higher values of b (b > 1.8)
are just a small subset of an infinite number of possible values, it is clearly
shown that a reasonable fraction of cooperators can survive even in an extremely
adverse situation where the advantage of defecting is very high. Indeed, our
results show that some combinations of high values of l and δ, such as for δ = 0.8
and l = 0.7, can further improve the levels of cooperation, allowing for the full
dominance of cooperation.
6 Investigating the Robustness of Cooperation in a
Biased Environment
The previous experiments revealed that the presence of abstainers together with
simple coevolutionary rules (i.e., the COPD game) act as a powerful mechanism
to avoid the spread of defectors, which also allows the dominance of cooperation
in a wide range of scenarios.
However, the distribution of the strategies in the initial population used in
all of the previous experiments was uniform. That is, we have explored cases
in which the initial population contained a balanced amount of cooperators,
defectors and abstainers. Thus, in order to explore the robustness of these out-
comes in regard to the initial amount of abstainers in the population, we now
aim to investigate how many abstainers would be necessary to guarantee robust
cooperation.
Figure 8 features the fraction of each strategy in the population (i.e., coop-
erators, defectors and abstainers) over time for fixed values of b = 1.9, ∆ = 0.72
and δ = 0.8. In this experiment, several independent simulations were performed,
in which the loner’s payoff (l) and the number of abstainers in the initial popu-
lation were varied from 0.0 to 1.0 and from 0.1% to 99.9%, respectively. Other
special cases were also analyzed, such as placing only one abstainer into a bal-
anced population of cooperators and defectors, and placing only one defector
and one cooperator in a population of abstainers. For the sake of simplicity, we
report only the values of l = {0.2, 0.6, 0.8} for an initial population with one
abstainer and with 5%, 33% and 90% abstainers, which are representative of the
outcomes at other values also.
Note that, for all these simulations, the initial population of cooperators and
defectors remained in balance. For instance, an initial population with 50% of
abstainers, will consequently have 25% of cooperators and 25% of defectors.
Experiments reveal that the COPD game is actually extremely robust to
radical changes in the initial population of abstainers. It has been shown that if
the loner’s payoff is greater than 0.55 (l > 0.55), then one abstainer might alone
be enough to protect cooperators from the invasion of defectors (see Figures 8a,
8b and 8c). However, this outcome is only possible if the single abstainer is in
the middle of a big cluster of defectors.
This outcome can happen because the payoff obtained by the abstainers is
always greater than the one obtained by pairs of defectors (i.e., L < P ). Thus, in
a cluster of defectors, abstention is always the best choice. However, as this single
abstainer reduces the population of defectors, which consequently increases the
population of abstainers and cooperators in the population, defection may start
to be a good option again due to the increase of cooperators. Therefore, the
exploitation of defectors by abstainers must be as fast as possible, otherwise,
they might not be able to effectively attack the population of defectors. In this
scenario, the loner’s payoff is the key parameter to control the speed in which
abstainers invade defectors. This explains why a single abstainer is usually not
enough to avoid the dominance of defectors when l < 0.55.
In this way, as the loner’s payoff is the only parameter that directly affects
the evolutionary dynamics of the abstainers, intuition might lead one to expect
to see a clear and perhaps linear relationship between the loner’s payoff and the
initial number of abstainers in the population. That is, given the same set of
parameters, increasing the initial population of abstainers or the loner’s payoff
(l) would probably make it easier for abstainers to increase or even dominate the
population. Despite the fact that it might be true for high values of the loner’s
payoff (i.e., l ≥ 0.8, as observed in Figure 8) is not applicable to other scenarios.
Actually, as it is also shown in Figure 8, if the loner’s payoff is less than 0.55,
changing the initial population of abstainers does not change the outcome at
all. When 0.55 ≤ l < 0.8, a huge initial population of abstainers can actually
promote cooperation best.
As discussed in Section 5.3, populations of cooperators and abstainers tend
to converge to cooperation. In this way, the scenario showed in Figure 8 for
l = 0.8 will probably end up with cooperators dominating the population, but
as the loner’s payoff is close to the reward for mutual cooperation, the case in
Figure 8i will converge faster than the one showed in Figure8l.
Another very counter-intuitive behaviour occurs in the range l = [0.45, 0.55]
(this range may shift a little bit depending on the value of b), where the outcome
Fig. 8: Time course of each strategy for b = 1.9, ∆ = 0.72, δ = 0.8 and different
values of l (from left to right, l = {0.2, 0.6, 0.8}). The same settings are also
tested on populations seeded with different amount of abstainers (i.e, from top
to bottom: 1 abstainer, 5% of the population, 1/3 of the population, 90% of the
population).
is usually of abstainers quickly dominating the population (Sect.5.3). In this sce-
nario, we would expect that changes in the initial population of abstainers would
at least change the speed in which the abstainers fixate in the population. That
is, a huge initial population of abstainers would probably converge quickly. How-
ever, it was observed that the convergence speed is almost the same regardless
of the size of the initial population of abstainers.
In summary, results show that an initial population with 5% of abstainers
is usually enough to make reasonable changes in the outcome, increasing the
chances of cooperators surviving or dominating the population.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper studies the impact of a simple coevolutionary model in which not
only the agents’ strategies but also the network evolves over time. The model
consists of placing agents playing the Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma game in a
dynamic spatial environment, which in turn, defines the Coevolutionary Optional
Prisoner’s Dilemma (COPD) game.
In summary, based on the results of several Monte Carlo simulations, it was
shown that the COPD game allows for the emergence of cooperation in a wider
range of scenarios than the Coevolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma (CPD) game
(i.e., the same coevolutionary model in populations which do not have the option
to abstain from playing the game). Results also showed that COPD performs
much better than the traditional version of these games (i.e., the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) and the Optional Prisoner’s Dilemma (OPD) games) where only
the strategies evolve over time in a static and unweighted network. Moreover, we
observed that the COPD game is actually able to reproduce outcomes similar
to other games by setting the parameters as follows:
– CPD: l = 0.
– OPD: ∆ = 0 (or δ = 0).
– PD: l = 0 and ∆ = 0 (or δ = 0).
Also, it was possible to observe that abstention acts as an important mech-
anism to avoid the dominance of defectors. For instance, in adverse scenarios
such as when the defector’s payoff is very high (i.e., b > 1.7), for both PD and
CPD games, defectors spread quickly and dominated the environment. On the
other hand, when abstainers were present (COPD game), cooperation was able
to survive and even dominate.
Furthermore, simulations showed that defectors die off when the loner’s pay-
off is greater than 0.7 (l > 0.7). However, it was observed that increasing the
loner’s payoff makes it difficult for cooperators to dominate abstainers, which is
a counter-intuitive result, since the loner’s payoff is always less than the reward
for mutual cooperation (i.e., L < R), this scenario should always lead coopera-
tors to dominance very quickly. In this scenario, cooperation is still the dominant
strategy in most cases, but it might require several Monte Carlo steps to reach
a stable state.
Results revealed that the COPD game also allows scenarios of cyclic domi-
nance between the three strategies (i.e., cooperation, defection and abstention),
indicating that, for some parameter settings, the COPD game is intransitive.
That is, the population remains balanced in such a way that cooperators invade
abstainers, abstainers invade defectors and defectors invade cooperators, closing
a cycle.
We also explored the robustness of these outcomes in regard to the initial
amount of abstainers in the population (biased population). In summary, it was
shown that, in some of the scenarios, even one abstainer might alone be enough
to protect cooperators from the invasion of defectors, which in turn increases the
chances of cooperators surviving or dominating the population.
Although recent research has considered coevolving game strategy (with op-
tional games) and link weights [4], this work presents a more complete analysis.
We conclude that the combination of both of these trends in evolutionary game
theory may shed additional light on gaining an in-depth understanding of the
emergence of cooperative behaviour in real-world scenarios.
Future work will consider the exploration of different topologies and the
influence of a wider range of scenarios, where, for example, agents could rewire
their links, which, in turn, adds another level of complexity to the model. Future
work will also involve applying our studies and results to realistic scenarios, such
as social networks and real biological networks.
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